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This thesis studies the economics of local labor markets.
There are three chapters in the thesis, and each one examines
how economic outcomes are affected by local labor market
conditions.

Chapter 1
The first chapter analyzes the incidence of local labor
demand shocks. It begins from the observation that low-skill
workers are comparatively immobile. When labor demand
slumps in a city, college-educated workers tend to relocate,
whereas noncollege workers are disproportionately likely to
remain and face declining wages and employment (Glaeser
and Gyourko 2005). A standard explanation of these facts
is that mobility is more costly for low-skill workers (Topel
1986; Bound and Holzer 2000).
In this chapter, I propose and test an alternative explanation that focuses on why low-skill workers may be disproportionately compensated during adverse labor demand
shocks, rather than why it may be disproportionately costly
for them to migrate. This explanation has two components.
First, I document that adverse shocks substantially reduce
the cost of housing. This fact and the existing evidence that
the expenditure share on housing declines with income imply
that low-skill workers are disproportionately compensated
by housing price declines. Second, means-tested public assistance programs disproportionately compensate low-skill
workers during adverse shocks. I document that, not surprisingly, aggregate transfer program expenditures are highly
responsive to local labor market conditions.
These two different types of explanations (one based on
mobility costs and one based on compensating factors) are
not incompatible; however, their relative importance ultimately determines the actual incidence of local labor demand
shocks. If out-migration of workers is low primarily because
of mobility costs, then the incidence of local labor demand
shocks will be primarily borne by workers; additionally, to
the extent that mobility costs are greater for low-skill workers, they may disproportionately bear the incidence of the
adverse shock. Alternatively, if the incidence of adverse local
labor demand shocks is primarily borne by immobile housing
and social insurance programs, then low-skill workers will
be disproportionately compensated and, consequently, less
likely to out-migrate.
I develop and estimate a spatial equilibrium model that
captures how wages, population, housing prices, and transfer
payments reequilibrate following a shift in local labor de-
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mand. The model is based on the spatial equilibrium model
in Roback (1982). Following Glaeser and Gyourko (2005),
the model allows for a concave local housing supply curve,
arising from the durability of the local housing stock.1 While
the Glaeser and Gyourko model assumes perfect mobility,
I allow for heterogeneous mobility costs that limit spatial
arbitrage, as in Topel (1986). Unlike the preceding models, I
explicitly model local labor demand.
The two primary empirical implications of the model
are 1) if positive labor demand shocks increase population
more than negative shocks reduce population, it suggests the
existence of a concave housing supply curve and/or heterogeneous mobility costs; and 2) if positive shocks increase
housing prices more than negative shocks reduce housing
prices, that is consistent with the existence of heterogeneous
mobility costs.
The model guides the empirical strategy, which consists
of two steps. In the first step, I test for asymmetric responses
of wages, employment, population, and housing prices to
symmetric labor demand shocks. The validity of this exercise
requires constructing plausibly exogenous positive and
negative shifts in local labor demand of equal magnitude. I
follow Bartik (1991) in constructing an instrumental variable
for local labor demand shocks by interacting cross-sectional
differences in industrial composition with national changes
in industry employment shares. I find robust evidence using
U.S. census data that positive local labor demand shocks
increase population (and employment) more than negative
shocks reduce population (and employment), and that this
asymmetry is greater for low-skill workers. These robust
asymmetric relationships for local population and employment contrast sharply with the absence of any evidence of a
similar asymmetric relationship for (any measure of) wages,
housing values, and rental prices, though all of these other
variables are consistent with an asymmetric housing supply
curve and limited mobility costs.
To quantitatively estimate the magnitude of mobility costs
by skill and the shape of the housing supply curve, in the
second set of empirical analyses I estimate the full model using a nonlinear, simultaneous equations generalized method
of moments (GMM) estimator. The GMM estimates suggest
that the housing supply curve is concave (so that housing
is more elastically supplied following increases in housing
demand than following decreases in housing demand) and
that (over decadal time horizons) mobility costs are not large
and are comparable for both high-skill and low-skill workers.
The GMM results reveal several other important findings.
First, the observed asymmetric population responses are primarily accounted for by an asymmetric housing supply curve
rather than due to substantial barriers to mobility. Second,
the results suggest that the observed difference in out-migration by skill is primarily accounted for by transfer payments
rather than to differences by skill in housing expenditure
shares. Lastly, the results suggest that the primary explana-
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tion for the comparative immobility of low-skill workers is
not higher mobility costs, but rather a lower incidence of
adverse local labor demand shocks. Consequently, much of
the incidence of adverse labor demand shocks is diffused to
homeowners, landlords, and public assistance programs.

Chapter 2
The second chapter, written jointly with Daron Acemoglu
and Amy Finkelstein, studies how local area health spending
responds to permanent changes in local area income. This
chapter is motivated by the fact that health expenditures as
a share of GDP in the United States have more than tripled
over the last half century, from 5 percent in 1960 to 16 percent in 2005 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
2006). A common conjecture is that the rise in the share of
income spent on health care expenditures is a direct, or at
least a natural, consequence of the secular increase in living
standards—because health care is a “luxury good.”2 The
Economist magazine stated this as a conventional wisdom
in 1993, writing: “As with luxury goods, health spending
tends to rise disproportionately as countries become richer”
(quoted in Blomqvist and Carter [1997], p. 27).
This view has recently been forcefully articulated by Hall
and Jones (2007). They argue that extension allows individuals to escape diminishing marginal utility of consumption
within a period. The Hall-Jones view also receives indirect
support from the very high estimates of the value of life and
value of health provided by Nordhaus (2003) and Murphy
and Topel (2003, 2006). The fact that most other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries have also experienced substantial growth in their
health sector over the last half century (OECD 2004) also
makes the secular rise in incomes a natural candidate to explain the rise in the health share of GDP in the United States.
Understanding the extent to which the rise in the health
share of GDP is a direct consequence of the rise in living
standards is important for several reasons. First, it enables a
proper accounting of the notable growth in the United States
(and OECD) health care sector over the last half century.
Second, it is necessary for forecasting how health care
spending is likely to evolve in coming years. Finally, it is a
crucial first step toward an assessment of the optimality of
the growth of the health care sector. In particular, if health
spending is strongly increasing in income, so that rising
income can explain most or all of the rising health share, it
would be more likely that the increasing share of GDP allocated to health is socially optimal.3
The relationship between income and health spending is
the subject of a voluminous empirical literature. Remarkably,
however, virtually all existing estimates are based on simple
correlations of income and health care spending, across
individuals, across countries, or over time. These correlations
are consistent with income elasticities ranging from close to

0 to substantially above 1.4 In light of the paucity of existing evidence, Hall and Jones (2007) conclude their paper by
stating that, “Our model makes the strong prediction that if
one looks hard enough and carefully enough, one ought to be
able to see income effects [with elasticities above 1] in the
micro data. Future empirical work will be needed to judge
this prediction.”
The objective here is to provide causal estimates of the
effect of income on aggregate health spending. The strategy
is to exploit the time-series variation in global oil prices
between 1970 and 1990, which impacted incomes differentially across different parts of the Southern United States
that vary in the oil intensity of the local economy. In our
baseline specification we approximate local economies by
economics subregions (ESRs), which consist of groups of
counties within a state that have strong economic ties. We
focus on the southern United States to increase the comparability of the ESRs, in particular to minimize the likelihood
of differential trends in health care expenditure driven by
other factors. Our empirical strategy exploits the interaction
between global oil prices and ESR-level importance of oil in
the economy as an instrument for income. Our main proxy
for the importance of oil is the size of preexisting oil reserves
in an ESR. The identifying assumption is that the interaction between global oil price changes and local oil reserves
should have no effect on changes in the demand for health
care, except through income. We provide several pieces of
evidence that are supportive of the validity of this identifying assumption. Using this instrumental-variable strategy we
estimate an elasticity of ESR-level hospital spending with
respect to ESR-level income of 0.72 (standard error = 0.21).
Point estimates of the income elasticity from a wide range
of alternative specifications fall on both sides of our baseline
estimate, but are almost always less than 1.
Because our instrument impacts incomes at the ESR level
(rather than individual income), our estimates correspond to
local general equilibrium effects of income changes, but will
not capture any global or national general equilibrium effects.5 Of particular concern is that if the growth of the health
care market resulting from the rise in global incomes induced
more innovation, our estimates may not incorporate the
implications of these induced innovations on health expenditures. Our analysis suggests that significantly larger elasticities resulting from these induced innovation general equilibrium effects are unlikely for two reasons. First, the same
induced innovation effects working at the national or global
level should manifest themselves as increased technology
adoption or entry of new hospitals at the local (ESR) level.
However, we find no statistically or substantively significant
effects of local income on hospital entry or on various measures of technology adoption at the ESR level. In this light, a
significant global-induced innovation effect seems unlikely.
Second, technological change should be more rapid for sectors that are expanding faster than others (e.g., Acemoglu

2002; Acemoglu and Linn 2004). Since health care appears
to have an income elasticity above 1, induced innovations
should relatively favor the non-health sectors that have an
income elasticity above 1.
We therefore use our local general equilibrium income
elasticity estimate to perform a back of the envelope calculation of the role that rising income has played in the rising
U.S. health share. Our central point estimate of 0.72 suggests
that rising income would be associated with a modest decline
in the health share of GDP. Perhaps more informatively, the
upper end of the 95 percent confidence interval of this estimate is 1.13; this allows us to reject the hypothesis that rising
real income explains more than 0.5 percentage points of the
11 percentage point increase in the health share of U.S. GDP
between 1960 and 2005.

Chapter 3
The third chapter of the dissertation, written jointly
with Kory Kroft, studies theoretically and empirically how
optimal Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits vary with
local labor market conditions. This chapter is motivated
by the fact that existing studies on the effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment durations (e.g., Moffitt
1985; Meyer 1990; Chetty 2008) do not distinguish between
changes in benefits when local labor market conditions are
good and changes in benefits when local labor market conditions are poor. As Alan Krueger and Bruce Meyer (2002,
pp. 64–65) remark: “[F]or some programs, such as UI, it is
quite likely that the adverse incentive effects vary over the
business cycle. For example, there is probably less of an efficiency loss from reduced search effort by the unemployed
during a recession than during a boom. As a consequence,
it may be optimal to expand the generosity of UI during
economic downturns . . . Unfortunately, this is an area in
which little empirical research is currently available to guide
policymakers.”
If the moral hazard cost of UI depends on local labor
market conditions, this may imply that optimal UI benefits
should respond to shifts in local labor demand. However,
there exists little empirical evidence on measuring how local
labor market conditions affect the moral hazard cost of UI,
since many of the studies that conduct a welfare analysis of
UI do not consider whether and to what extent UI benefits
should vary with local labor market conditions (Baily 1978;
Chetty 2006, 2008; Shimer and Werning 2007; Kroft 2008).
In this chapter, we conduct both positive and normative
economic analyses to investigate how local labor market
conditions affect the moral hazard cost of UI. On the positive side, we consider the disincentive effect of UI and the
unemployment rate. We first consider workers who set a
reservation wage and face an exogenous arrival rate of job
offers. In this version of the model, the relationship between
the unemployment rate and elasticity of duration with respect
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to the UI benefit level is theoretically ambiguous; however,
when we calibrate the model using realistic parameter values
selected from the literature, the duration elasticity is positively correlated with the unemployment rate.6 This analysis
suggests that the moral hazard cost of UI increases with the
unemployment rate, contrary to the speculation of Krueger
and Meyer (2002), as well as existing UI policy in the United
States and many other developed countries.
We extend the search model to encapsulate the more
realistic scenario where workers affect the job finding rate
by increasing their search efforts. In this model with an
endogenous job offer arrival rate, the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the UI benefits is the sum of
behavioral responses of reservation wages and search effort.
We show that whether moral hazard rises or falls with the unemployment rate depends on the relative importance of these
two behavioral channels.
Recent empirical work on the behavioral responses to
social insurance programs finds that more generous benefits
do not lead to higher wages (see Card, Chetty, and Weber
2007). Given that higher UI benefits raise durations, this
leads us to suspect that the search effort channel is empirically more important than the reservation wage channel. We
examine this question by calibrating the search model with
endogenous search effort and considering how variation in
local labor market conditions affects the duration elasticity.
For different ranges of parameter values, the elasticity can be
either positively or negatively related to the unemployment
rate. This ambiguity is coming entirely through the search
channel—the reservation wage component of the duration
elasticity is always increasing with the unemployment rate.
We thus conclude from our model and calibrations that the
relationship between the duration elasticity and the local
unemployment rate is ultimately an empirical question.
To empirically test how the duration elasticity varies with
the local unemployment rate, we exploit variation in UI benefit levels within states over time and interact the effect of
UI benefit generosity with the state unemployment rate.7 Our
findings indicate that the elasticity of unemployment duration
with respect to UI benefits is significantly lower when the
local unemployment rate is high. In our preferred specification, the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to
UI benefits is 0.741 (s.e. 0.340) at the mean unemployment
rate. However, a 1 standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate (an increase of 1.68 percentage points) reduces
the magnitude of the duration elasticity by 0.239 to 0.502 (a
decline in magnitude of 32.3 percent). To interpret this finding as evidence that the moral hazard cost of UI falls with the
unemployment rate, we conduct a variety of robustness tests
to address concerns that the interaction effect we estimate is
driven by compositional changes, unobserved trends, sample
selection, and liquidity effects, and find no evidence that any
of these concerns are primarily responsible for our effect. We
therefore conclude that the association between the duration
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elasticity and the local unemployment rate indicates that
the moral hazard cost of UI varies systematically with local
labor market conditions.
Finally, we show that when the moral hazard cost of UI
depends on local labor market conditions, this has important implications for the welfare consequences of UI. We
develop a simple formula for the optimal level of unemployment benefits which takes into account how the behavioral
response to UI benefits varies with local labor market conditions. The formula is stated in terms of our reduced-form
parameter estimates and is thus in the spirit of the “sufficient
statistics” approach to welfare analysis (Chetty 2009). The
primary advantage of this method is that it can be implemented with relatively few parameter estimates.8 Furthermore, these parameters can often be empirically estimated
using a credible quasi-experimental research design. One
disadvantage of this approach is that it is not well-suited to
out-of-sample counterfactual analysis because the sufficient
statistics are only valid for relatively “local” changes in the
policy-relevant parameters. Using our reduced-form empirical estimates to calibrate the optimal UI formula implied by
our model, we find that a 1 standard deviation increase in
the local unemployment rate leads to a 6.4 percentage point
increase in the optimal replacement rate. To give a sense of
the magnitude of this policy change, it is roughly equivalent
to a 1 unit change in the coefficient of relative risk aversion
in the model (e.g., from γ = 2 to γ = 3).
Notes
1. Throughout the paper I use the term “concave housing supply
curve” to imply that positive housing demand shocks increase
housing prices less than equal-sized negative shocks reduce
housing prices. More formally, a concave housing supply curve
implies that ∂2(housing price)/∂(housing supply)2 < 0.
2. Throughout we use the term luxury good to designate an empirical income elasticity greater than 1 (and similarly “necessity”
refers to an elasticity less than 1). This responsiveness to income
may result from preferences, policy or other factors.
3. Of course, a large role for income would only be suggestive,
not dispositive. A systematic analysis of social optimality would
also have to consider potential externalities in health provision
and in health R&D, as well as informational and institutional
constraints in the health care market.
4. OECD (2004) provides a survey of the large empirical literature
on the correlation between income and health spending (see,
particularly, Annex 2B). The cross-sectional relationship across
individuals between income and health spending tends to be
small or negative (e.g., Newhouse and Phelps 1976). In contrast,
cross-country analysis tends to suggest income elasticities greater than 1 (e.g., Newhouse 1977; Gerdtham and Jonsson 2000),
as do time-series analyses of the relationship between income
growth and growth in health spending for individual countries
(e.g., Fogel 1999).
5. We also present results at the state level rather than the ESR
level. This reduces our cross-sectional variation in oil intensity
but allows us to capture general equilibrium effects at a higher
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level of geographic aggregation than the ESR. The results are
similar.
6. Additionally, we show that we can resolve the theoretical ambiguity by making assumptions on the distribution of wages. If the
distribution of wages has a nonincreasing hazard rate (as would
be the case if wage offers had a Pareto distribution), then the
duration elasticity will be increasing in the unemployment rate.
7. In ongoing work we are constructing variation in state unemployment rates that is driven by plausibly exogenous shifts in
local labor demand by following the procedure in Bartik (1991).
8. We cannot conduct a full sufficient statistics analysis without
reduced-form estimates of how the consumption smoothing
benefits of UI vary with local labor market conditions. We hope
that future work will build on Gruber (1997) and investigate this
reduced-form effect.
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